This article analyzes the impact of removing the U.S. tobacco program in both a partial and general welfare economics framework. In a partial-equilibrium framework, a consumer taxfunded quota buyout can result in producer gains, consumer losses, net losses resulting from higher prices, and deadweight losses. In a general-equilibrium framework, society can gain from the buyout resulting from considerable potential savings from reduced healthcare costs attributable to a reduction in smoking. Additionally, we present a model that addresses the addictive qualities of tobacco while considering the effects of the quota buyout. We also conclude that another possible effect of the buyout is an increase in worker productivity because employees who are able to quit smoking reduce the amount of smoking-related sick days taken.
Since 1938, the Agricultural Adjustment Act (in particular, the federal tobacco program) has limited the tobacco supply through production controls as a means to raise and stabilize the domestic tobacco price. Through the years, the Federal tobacco program received criticisms, especially from health advocates, partly because of growing health concerns about smoking. In the late 1990s, several costly lawsuits were brought against tobacco companies. These lawsuits produced court settlements that included the limitation of cigarette advertising as well as an agreement for the tobacco industry to pay states in excess of $200 billion over 25 years (Brown, Snell, and Tiller, 1999) .
In January 1998, the ''Core Principles of Agreement between the Public Health Community and the Tobacco Producer Community'' (produced by both health advocates and tobacco producers) was signed by nearly 100 organizations, including the American Cancer Society, the American Heart Association, the Burley Stabilization Corporation, the Burley Tobacco Growers Cooperation, Inc., and the Flue-Cured Tobacco Stabilization Corporation (Schmitz et al., 2010) . This document was designed to examine ways to reduce diseases caused by tobacco products (by effectively regulating tobacco production) and to aid the future prosperity and stability of the American tobacco farmer.
In 2003, tobacco buyout legislation was proposed in both the U.S. House and Senate. At approximately the same time, legislation proposing Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulation of the cigarette industry was introduced in the Senate. The effort to approve both the FDA regulation of cigarettes and a tobacco buyout stalled in October 2003 when some health advocates rejected the version of FDA regulation offered in the House Bill. Health advocates not only wanted FDA regulation of cigarettes, but also continued federal oversight and regulation of tobacco production.
On October 22, 2004, President George W. Bush signed into law H.R. 4520 (the American Jobs Creation Act). Among the provisions was ''The Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act of 2004,'' which terminated the 66-year-old federal tobacco program and provided compensation to owners of tobacco quotas (possession of which required marketing tobacco at the support price under the program) and to tobacco producers. Ending the tobacco program effectively deregulated U.S. tobacco production and prices, which had been constrained by acreage allotments, marketing quotas, and price supports since the 1930s.
The passage in 2004 of ''The Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act'' is viewed by some as a substantial defeat for health advocates because H.R. 4520 not only lacked provisions for FDA regulation of cigarettes, but it also eliminated regulation of tobacco production and marketing (Brown, Rucker, and Thurman, 2007) .
A primary concern of legislators from the tobacco states, who generally supported termination of the tobacco program, was obtaining compensation for quota owners and tobacco growers. To move the legislation forward, they were willing to ally themselves with health advocates in supporting FDA regulation of cigarette manufacturing and marketing. Those nontobacco-state legislators who were opposed to increased government regulation of the cigarette industry generally also endorsed terminating the tobacco program and providing compensation to tobacco quota owners and growers. Cigarette manufacturers generally were opposed to FDA regulation of their activities and were in favor of terminating the tobacco program.
This article presents a benefit-cost analysis of the termination of the U.S. tobacco program. In addition, negative externalities associated with smoking are integrated into the analysis. The results show clearly that cutting back on the demand for tobacco products through many factors such as ending the tobacco program can generate large societal benefits. However, if the negative externalities are not taken into account, cases arise in which the costs of eliminating and/ or reducing tobacco consumption can exceed the accompanying benefits.
Theory
The focus is the impact of the U.S. tobacco program on tobacco users. Consider Figure 1 , where S is the producer supply schedule and D t is the total derived demand for tobacco. The competitive price and output are p 0 and q 0 , respectively. Now consider the effect of a production quota that restricts quantity to q 1 (Just, Hueth, and Schmitz, 2004) . The price rises to p 1 and producers gain
, whereas consumers lose, measured by the area under the derived demand curve, p 1 p 0 ba ð Þ. The true value of the quota for quota owners is p 1 p 2 ca ð Þand the deadweight loss of introducing the quota is acb ð Þ. Figure 1 also depicts a theoretical, consumer tax-funded production quota buyout where a true value of the quota is p 1 p 2 ca ð Þand Figure 1 . Theoretical Quota Implementation and Removal an inflated value of the quota used for the buyout is lmno ð Þ.
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Consider now the effect when the production quota is removed. If the buyout exactly equaled the true value of the quota through a tobacco tax, quota owners would have neither reason nor incentive to support the buyout. This is because their net gain would be zero over the time period when the tax would be in place to pay for the buyout. After that period, the net gain to producers falls because prices are no longer supported. The net effect of the buyout on quota owners and consumers from a consumption tax is zero until the competitive equilibrium is restored (Schmitz, Schmitz, and Haynes, 2012) .
When the production buyout occurs under an inflated value of the quota, the consumer tax is put into place and this causes the consumer price to rise to l, whereas the producer price falls to m. Under the inflated quota case, producers gain an amount lp 1 eo ð ÞÀ enca ð Þ ½ and consumers lose lp 1 ao ð Þ. These gains and losses are incurred per year, every year that the tax/ buyout is in place. It is important to note that the deadweight loss increases from acb ð Þ to onb ð Þ as a result of the quota buyout. When competitive equilibrium is restored at the end of the compensation period, immediately producers lose
, consumers gain lp 0 bo ð Þ, and the deadweight loss is eliminated.
The Consumer Tax Buyout Effect

Partial Equilibrium
Within this framework, we can determine empirically the effect of the tobacco buyout on consumers and producers. Consider Figure 2 , in which a $1.00/lb. quota buyout is depicted.
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The net producer gain from removing the quota is $202 million per year (Table 1 ). The total net consumer loss from removing the quota is $292 million per year (Table 1) . Therefore, given a present value calculation (with a 5% discount rate), over the 10-year compensation period, producers gain $1.3 billion and consumers lose $2.3 billion. Given these gains and losses, the benefit-cost ratio for this period is 0.70. On the culmination of the 10-year buyout, when competitive equilibrium is restored, producers immediately lose $295 million, because the consumer tax is no longer in place. Meanwhile, consumers gain $390 million in the absence of the tax (Table 2) . In this case, the benefit-cost ratio at this point in time is 1.32.
Declining Demand Conditions and General Equilibrium
Although the previously described model assumes a demand schedule for tobacco at the time of the buyout, the demand for tobacco products has actually fallen sharply since that time. According to Brown and Snell (2012) Consider the U.S. tobacco production quota buyout under falling demand conditions. As time moves forward, the demand for tobacco shifts left as less tobacco is consumed. Importantly, this results in a loss in consumer surplus from the decreasing demand when measured only in the tobacco market.
In a general equilibrium framework, however, at least part of the consumer surplus losses that occur during a buyout can be attributed to both a change in preferences away from tobacco and a change in relative prices that favors nontobacco product consumption. As we show subsequently, the losses measured in the tobacco market are overstated. Under this scenario there could be subsequent impacts in additional markets (e.g., healthcare costs decrease because fewer people are smoking for reasons including higher prices for tobacco products).
3
Consider Figure 3A in which at price p 1 the quantity demanded of tobacco is q 1 and consumer surplus is ap 1 d ð Þ. If demand shifts to D9, quantity demanded falls to q 2 for price p 1 . The loss in consumer welfare is abcd ð Þ. Note that the expenditure on tobacco has been reduced by cefd ð Þ. Given a general equilibrium framework, as an example, consider a potential change in tastes and preferences wherein consumers transfer the would-be expenditure on tobacco cedf ð Þ to another market (organic food). In Figure 3B the price and quantity of organic food are p 1 and q 1 , respectively, with the tobacco demand of D. Now, if cefd ð Þ from Figure 3A is spent on organic food and we set cefd ð Þ equal to p 2 p 1 hq 1 q 2 i ð Þ in Figure 3B , price rises to p 2 and consumption rises to q 2 . There is a gain in consumer welfare of
, which is positive, plus a producer gain of p 2 p 1 hi ð Þ. Thus, the impact of reducing smoking is: 
Demand for Tobacco and Addiction
An important consideration regarding the demand for tobacco overtime is the fact that it is an addictive good. This addictive property somewhat complicates the analysis of the quota buyout; in fact, Weimer, Vining, and Thomas (2009) acknowledge this and state that ''The valuation of changes in consumption of addictive goods resulting from policy interventions presents a challenge for cost-benefit analysts.'' Although the demand for tobacco has been There is a very interesting twist to this analysis because of the negative health effects from smoking. In these models, when competitive equilibrium is restored at the end of the buyout, it is assumed that a price decrease in tobacco (and subsequently cigarettes) results in a gain to consumers. However, health advocates argue that the tobacco program originally generated gains to consumers by keeping tobacco prices high, thereby reducing the demand for tobacco. Using their argument, the tobacco program results in net societal gains because both producers and consumers gain from tobacco-production quotas. Conversely, under the same logic, the tobacco quota buyout results in a loss to both producers and consumers as producers no longer have prices supported by the quota and consumers increase consumption as a result of lower prices. falling since the tobacco buyout (mostly as a result of rising federal and state taxes, which subsequently raise prices), there are a certain number of consumers whose demand is not likely to be affected by higher prices as a result of their addiction.
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), over 50% of smokers have tried to quit at least once and failed (Tirrell, 2012) . Understandably, it is important to try to include addiction into the demand for cigarettes. Figure 4 depicts a theoretical model where D A is the addicted demand schedule, D N is the nonaddicted demand schedule, and D T is the total demand schedule (summed horizontally). In the case of a consumer-tax buyout, because of consumer price increases, the nonaddicted smokers eventually leave the market (reducing societal healthcare costs). If the remaining smokers are truly addicted, facing demand D A D N , their consumption of cigarettes is not affected by the high taxes and/or price of cigarettes. These trends continue until there are only addicted smokers left in the market and healthcare costs can no longer be reduced.
An issue with the demand for a harmful and addictive good is that of utility. More specifically, Gruber (2003 Gruber ( /2004 states that ''With respect to smoking, people may recognize that smoking provides them with utility (benefits) in the current time period, but that they will experience some disutility (such as impaired health) in some future time periods.'' Taken a step further, future impaired health is not only a disutility to the individual; it is also a disutility to society, especially regarding healthcare costs. This ties right into the next section on healthcare costs associated with smoking.
Negative Externalities from Smoking: Review of Articles
In Appendix A, we discuss the effect of smoking on worker productivity. Annual costs resulting from smoking-related absences total $97 billion (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2008) . In Appendix B, we examine healthcare expenditures in relation to cigarette Secondhand smoke exposure predicted COPD and other tobacco-related mortality in a 17-year cohort study in China. The study followed 910 subjects that were exposed to secondhand smoke at home or at work, of which 249 died as a result of coronary heart disease, lung cancer, COPD, or ischemic stroke. The authors concluded that there is evidence supporting that secondhand smoke causes COPD and ischemic stroke (He et al., 2012) .
According to the CDC, in 2009, the incidence of lung cancer in the United States was 205,974 and the number of deaths was 158,081 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2013). Lung cancer deaths surpass colon, breast, and prostate cancer combined (American Cancer Society, 2012). The lung cancer 5-year survival rate is 16.3% compared with colon, breast, and prostate cancer at 65.2%, 90%, and 99.9%, respectively (Howlader et al., 2012) . Active smoking is responsible for approximately 90% of lung cancer cases (Alberg and Samet, 2003) .
In a major ruling (November 27, 2012), Federal Judge Gladys Kessler ordered that major tobacco companies must (1) say that they have deliberately deceived smokers; (2) tell the public the truth regarding the dangers of smoking; and (3) inform the public that smoking kills more people than murder, car crashes, drug abuse, and AIDS combined (USA Today.com, 2012) . In 1999, a large class action suit was launched against the tobacco companies and a settlement occurred. The Master Settlement Agreement awarded: (1) $206 billion to the states spread out over 25 years; (2) $1.5 billion over ten years to support state antismoking measures; and (3) $250 million to fund research into reducing youth smoking; banned the use of cartoon characters in tobacco marketing; and dissolved of tobacco trade organizations (Jones, 2010) . He et al. (2012) reported that ''a frank and graphic nationwide media campaign to motivate smokers to quit seems to be working.'' A key component of the campaign called ''Tips from Former Smokers'' began airing in March 2012. The advertisements are broadcast on virtually every form of media from newspapers to the Internet. The most extreme part of the campaign are TV commercials wherein ''a dozen or so ex-smokers offered very personal and often harrowing testimonials on the devastating health consequences that can result from years of tobacco use. '' HealthDay.com (2012) reports on new estimates from the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) that ''a 50-cent increase in the 4 Previous work has provided demand elasticity estimates for tobacco between -0.3 and 20.5 (Chan and Capehart, 2004; Sloan et al., 2003) . Total demand elasticity estimates for U.S. burley and flue-cured tobacco are 20.53 and -1.75, respectively, according to Brown, Snell, and Tiller (1999) . Serletis and Fetzer (2008) estimate demand elasticities for flue-cured ranging fromÀ0:72 to À1:24 and demand elasticities for burley ranging from À0:03 to À0:11. Weimer, Vining, and Thomas (2009) provide price elasticities of between -0.09 and -0.34. Goodwin and Sumner (1990) estimate the aggregate supply elasticity under the tobacco program to be approximately 4.0, whereas Fulginiti and Perrin (1993) estimate the supply price elasticity to be 7.0. In view of the wide range of price elasticities, we derived both the total demand elasticity (E DT ) and supply elasticity (E S ) used in Tables 1 and 2 . In the case of addicted demand (almost perfectly inelastic demand), producer gains would likely exceed the estimates provided in Table 1 . Likewise, consumer losses would also be greater under addicted demand conditions. U.S. tax on cigarettes could have a big impact on public health, though the benefits for the national wallet are less clear.'' The CBO reports that the increase, from the current federal tax of $1.01, ''could result in more than three million more nonsmokers by 2085-by either spurring people to quit or keeping would-be smokers from ever lighting up.'' Investigators analyzed data on more than 47,000 patients who had undergone colorectal resection resulting from cancer, inflammatory bowel disease, or diverticular disease (Sharma et al., 2012) . The researchers found that smokers faced a 30% higher likelihood of experiencing some type of major complication in the first 30 days after surgery compared with those who had never smoked. The investigators also found that smokers were more likely to die within that 30-day period than patients who had never smoked.
Conclusions
The end of the U.S. tobacco production quota program (paid for by a consumer tax) had a significant negative impact on the consumers of tobacco products. This may have been slightly offset by the fact that some consumers could have become better off because the higher prices persuaded them to give up smoking and find healthier substitutes. Within this context, addiction plays a role, because those who truly could not quit smoking paid even more to continue smoking. Importantly, the tobacco buyout led to a decrease in society's smoking-related healthcare costs as a result of the decrease in demand for tobacco. It also led to an increase in worker productivity because employees reduced the amount of smoking-related sick days taken. Of course, these two outcomes depend on what percentage of the smoking population was or was not truly addicted. Additional research would be necessary to determine the true impact that nonaddicted smokers had on reducing demand.
Further work on this subject might explore ''healthcare-cost equivalents'' borrowed from Schmitz, Kennedy, and Hill-Gabriel (2012) on environmental equivalents. If we compare our estimates on the consumer loss resulting from the U.S. tobacco buyout ($2.3 billion over 10 years) with the CDC's estimates of $193 billion per year in economic loss attributable to smoking, it is clear that the money saved in healthcare costs by even a slight reduction of smoking would heavily outweigh the consumer loss incurred resulting from higher tobacco prices. The benefit-cost ratios attached to programs aimed at reducing smoking can greatly exceed one when healthcare costs are taken into account.
One could also extend the benefit-cost analysis associated with smoking by including the environmental costs of removing cigarette butts from sidewalks and streets. Additionally, given that the most frequently littered items are cigarette butts-approximately 38% of all US roadway litter (Schultz et al., 2009) , it would be interesting to examine how much of the tobacco product litter (TPL) could have been reduced by the U.S. Tobacco Buyout.
